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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 23 MARCH, 1970 NUMBER 2
The Warren Court: Completion of a
Constitutional Revolution
William F. Swindler*
With the retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren fron the United
States Supreme Court, the time coies Jbr the critics to step away
in favor of the historians. In this article, Professor Swindler brings
the finished era into historical perspective with analysis of the
personalities, the issues, and the decisions of the Warren Court. He
sees the Court not only as the innovative and provocative organ to
which popular opinion has been directed, but also as a culmination
of a long-terni cycle of constitutional development.
I. A THIRTY-YEAR CYCLE
In the final weeks of its sixteen year history, the subject matter of
the Warren Court's opinions ranged over most of the major
constitutional issues with which it had concerned itself since 1953, and
out of which it developed the seminal decisions for which it will be
remembered. For example, it upheld an Alabama desegregation plan
which provided for proportional racial representation on public school
faculties,' and found a snack bar in a privately owned recreational
facility to be within the "public accomodations" definition of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 It rejected a North Carolina county's request to
reinstate a literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the
county had not met its burden of proving that for the past five years,
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, such a test had not been used
for voter disfranchisement on a racial basis. It applied the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to state criminal
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary;
General Counsel, Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision (1968).
I. United States v. Board of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
2. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
3. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
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procedure,4 upheld, under the first amendment an "equal time"
provision in an order of the Federal Communications Commission,5
and, in the process of invalidating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act,
overruled the 42-year-old case of Whitney v. California.' The Chief
Justice himself, speaking for the Court, invalidated a New York
freeholder voting law under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 7 and in a landmark opinion declared that in
determining upon the seating of duly elected representatives, Congress
was limited to the specific qualifications set out in the Constitution.'
In two California cases, the Court reiterated the rule that search of
person and premises, with or without warrant, was limited to the
immediate area of apprehension,9 while in cases from Maryland and
North Carolina, the Court set out applicable criteria for determination
of double jeopardy. 0
The many decisions of the Warren Court may be categorized as a
jurisprudence of individual integrity within the increasing constrictions
of a corporate society: the constitutional guarantee of equality of
opportunity between races, between voters, and between criminal
defendants. In addressing itself to this theme, the Warren Court
rounded out a cycle of constitutional change which has ranged over
three decades and completed a revolution in national history which
began in the crises of the New Deal and moved forward logically and
inexorably to the present."
The second century of the Constitution of the United States and
of the Supreme Court of the United States is distinguishable from the
first and is divisible into two broad periods with fairly definite dates
to mark their beginning and end. The first era, laizzez-faire dominance
in constitutional thought, was introduced by the Court's acceptance in
4. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
5. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
6. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
7. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 393 U.S. 818 (1969).
8. Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969).
10. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
II. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
RETROSPECT 1-25 (1957); W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY:
THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968 (1970); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968
S. CT. REV. 199; cf. W. SWINDLER, THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932, at 18-79 (1969); cf. Hand,
Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 COLUI. L. REV. 696 (1946);
Corwin, Our Constitutional Revolution and How to Round It Out, 19 PA. B.A.Q. 261 (1948);
cf. B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 26-61, 140-88, 342-72.
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1885 of Senator Roscoe Conkling's argument that the "person" in
amendment XI V, section 1 was understood to be a legal person as well
as an individual. 2 It lasted until 1937 when the knell sounded in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,'3 and the present era was ushered in
immediately thereafter in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."
In the half-century from the mid-eighties to the mid-thirties, the
dominant theme of constitutional decision had been- the narrow scope
of permissible legislative action-whether it was the experimental state
Granger laws which, in the face of judicial hostility, laid the
foundations for the administrative regulatory. agency, or the initial
congressional statutory efforts at antitrust legislation and the control
of interstate railroad activity in the form of the original Sherman Act
and the Interstate Commerce Commission Act. At the state and na-
tional level alike, lawmakers struggled to cope with the exploding big
business economy only to be rebuffed by a Court which at times seemed
obsessed with a zeal to leave the interstate corporation totally beyond
the reach of government.
The result of these years of narrow constitutional construction was
the development of a body of decisional law unequivocally supporting
a limited power of government in the area of economic affairs. When
the depression of the 1930's revealed the bankruptcy of the laissez-faire
concept of the economy, it followed that the constitutional rationale
committed to the validity of that concept would inevitably be found to
be bankrupt as well. As an ideological Armageddon approached, the
apostles of narrow construction found that they had cut off their own
avenues of retreat by their sweeping and gratuitous declarations of the
limited nature of constitutional power; the end came in the spring of
1937 with the Pyrrhic victory over the New Deal "court packing"
proposal, the cracking of the monolith of reaction on the Court itself,
and the beginning of a rebuilding of constitutional law during the latter
years of the Hughes Chief Justiceship.
The systematic broadening of the concept of legislative power
which characterized the decade following 1937-first under Hughes and
then under his successor as Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone-was
attended by a necessary overturning of a long series of precedents
which, in the half-century of laissez-faire, had undergirded the narrow
12. Santa Clara County v: Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); cf. San Mateo
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
13. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (police power of state extends to regulation of maximum hours
and minimum wages).
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of NLRB).
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legislative concept. Stone's administration of the Court, indeed, is
remembered today (as it was at the time) for the intellectual tumult
created by this uprooting of long-established landmarks and the trial
and error approach which seemed characteristic of constitutional
decision in the aftermath of the New Deal revolution."'
By the end of the Stone Chief Justiceship, new dimensions of
constitutional law were clearly discernible: Federal labor law, virtually
sui generis when Jones & Laughlin Steel was announced in 1937, had
become a many-faceted jurisprudence in its own right (and was about
to be fundamentally reoriented with the Taft-Hartley Act). 6 Social
welfare legislation-old age security and unemployment compensation
in particular-had come to be validated by the judiciary as a matter
of course. 7 The subject of civil liberties, annealed and hammered on
an anvil of war loyalty issues unknown to the now almost classical
"clear and present danger" tests evolved in the First World War, had
already introduced the related subjects of racial justice and the
inviolability of personal privacy. 8 A reexamination of societal and
individual rights in the context of criminal justice was about to begin.
The seven years under Chief Justice Vinson have been described,
perhaps somewhat wishfully, as a period in which the volatility of the
constitutional decisions of the later Roosevelt era was dampened
down.20 In the retrospect now provided by the succeeding era of the
Warren Court, the full consequences of the revolution of 1937-46 can
be better understood, and the Vinson interlude can be better described
as a seedtime for the constitutional propositions which were boldly
advanced, and bitterly debated, in the years from 1953 to the spring
of 1969.
In the perspective afforded by the end of the 30-year, counter-
laissez-faire jurisprudential development, the period covered by the
15. See generally A. MASON;HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OFTHE LAW 547-627 (1956).
16. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261 (1938); NLRB v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333 (1938). NLRB
v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corli., 306U.S. 240 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
.17. Cf. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937). -
18. Cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
19. Cf. Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943); Glasser v. United States, 3 15 U.S. 60 (1942); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
20. Cf. Allen, Chief Justice Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Governmtent: A
Tentative Appraisal, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 3 (1954); Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship,
21 U. CHI. L. REv. 212 (1954).
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Hughes-Stone judicial administration is now seen as a conservative
movement. That is to say, the half-century of dominance of the concept
of narrow legislative power could readily be counterbalanced by an
alternative concept of broad legislative power; if this did not mean a
simple return to a pre-1885 state of affairs, this could be explained by
the fact that political and economic circumstances had changed in the
meantime. But the essential fact was that a broad construction of
constitutional powers was readily to be found within American political
tradition; it was not a novel proposition of first impression.2! '
What the period of the Vinson Court revealed, however, was that
there were novel propositions of first impression which were
spontaneously generating from the economic and political stresses of
the depression decade of the thirties and the hot and cold war years of
the forties. In one sense, the constitutional pronouncements of the
period 1937-46 were simply an epitaph for the age of laissez-faire, now
forever dead. To coin a cliche, an era had ended with the release of
atomic energy at the end of World War II, and with it the release of
many pent-up political energies as well; underprivilege and
underdevelopment of all types and in all parts of the world were now
to demand prompt and drastic relief in favor of a rule of universal and
uniform equality.
Many of the issues of the Warren Court were anticipated in the
Vinson period, which from one viewpoint was a transitional era. For
example, the procedural rules for arrest and arraignment which came
to full flower in Mallory v. United States22 had their predecessor
opinions in the previous decade.2 In education, the summary rationale
represented in Engel v. Vitale,24 was prepared by the .pre-Warren
decisions on religion and the public schools.25 Similarly, the "'state
action" doctrine evolved from a barrier to integration into an
instrument for accelerating integration,"8 while the wheel of fate ground
inexorably toward Brown v. Board of Education.2 7 Indeed, most
21. Cf. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961.
22. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
23. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
24. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Compare Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1943), with Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1968), and Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. McLaurin v. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweat v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
1970]
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striking of all is the fact that Brown was originally argued and set for
reargument within the time span of the Vinson Court. 8 In another
respect, there has been a characteristic continuity in the constitutional
jurisprudence of the past three decades. Dissents, or non-unanimous"
opinions, have been the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, a
conscious use of the dissent-or, more especially, the concurring
opinion-has become more general; it might be argued, in fact, that it
has become almost an indispensable element in the development of the
Court's institutional position. While disparity of argument may
sometimes be a symptom of intellectual disintegration, as in the melee
of the Stone Court when dissents occasionally dissented from other
dissents, 0 the spectrum of conceptualization, which more often has
been covered by the several opinions in the same case, may contribute
greatly to intellectual strength.
The statistics of disagreement or at least non-unanimity have been
shown for the Hughes-Stones period on the Court (1930-46) to have
increased from 11 percent of the opinions in the earlier year to 64
percent in the last year.3 1 In the "quiescent" period of the Vinson
Court the percentage accelerated to a remarkabble 81 in the final year
of the Chief Justiceship.32 While the statistics for the Warren Court as
projected in the tables in the present study are not comparable- being
collected only for constitutional cases-those in Table I suggest a
percentage for the non-unanimous/di~senting cases seldom less than 50
and on one or two occasions exceeding 80. From this consistently high
level of divergency of views it could be hypothesized that the nature of
the constitutional revolution which began in 1937 has been to provoke
-a continuing process of reexamination of judicial positions on virtually
every issue which presents itself.
Part V of the present study considers the manner in which the non-
conforming rationales of the leading members of the Warren Court
have contributed to post-New Deal constitutionalism. For the history
of the Warren Court has not merely been one of continuity of the
Frankfurter-Jackson position in the alignment of Justices Harlan,
Stewart and White on the one hand, and the ascendancy of the Black-
Douglas position through the joinder of Justices Brennan, Goldberg-
28. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 344 U.S. 1, 141 (1952); 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
29. "Non-unanimous" is used as a modern equivalent to the now lesser known neinhw
contra dicende (N.C.D.) to indicate a divided opinion without dissent.
30. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 672 (1944); cf Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 619 (1944).
31. C. PRITCHETT-, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, Table 1, at 25 (1948).
32. C. PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT, Table I, at 21 (1954).
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Fortas, Marshall and the Chief Justice on the other. It has been, as
suggested by Parts I I-IV which follow, a vigorous, sometimes vi rulent,
dialogue over the premises and consequences involved in the vast new
propositions of constitutional law which have emerged in these sixteen
years.
TABLE I
VOTING RECORD ON CASES INVOLVING
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1953-1968
Cases with Unanimous Non-Unanimous* Opinions with
Term Const7 Opinions Opinions Dissents
Issues
1953 21 4 4 13
1954 31 12 6 13
1955 65 23 8 34
1956 31 5 1 25
1957 72 16- 1 55
1958 55 23 6 26
1959 40 19 8 13
1960 43 4 6 33
1961 35 13 4 19
1962 59 22 9 28
1963 49 12 3 34
1964 37 8 10 19
1965 40 13 9 18
1966 47 12 5 30
1967 72 16 15 41
1968 46 21 2 23
*Cases in which there were concurring opinions, but no dissents.
II. THE SHAPING OF THE WARREN COURT
As the October 1953 term of the Court opened, the Eisenhower
administration was completing its first nine months in office, an
armistice had been announced for the Korean War, and on Capitol Hill
Senator Joseph McCarthy's obsession with subversion in government
service was reaching a climax in paranoia which would result in his
formal censure the following year. The nuclear age had bred a
hyperconsciousness of the problem of security and national survival;
within four more years, Sputnik I would inaugurate the space age
and-with its stunning demonstration of the well advanced state of
Soviet technology-would have a dual impact upon the American
mind. On the one hand, Russian successes in space provoked demands
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
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THE WARREN COURT
for a matching emphasis on scientific training in the United States; on
the other, they heightened the insistence upon security and conformity.
For the mid-fifties represented the critical stage in the cold war on
the domestic front, and to a degree compromised the constitutional
argumentation of the Court at the same time that it toughened. its
intellectural fibre. With Congress, which tended to view the
unconventional with suspicion if not hostility, the breaking of new
ground by the judicial branch of government was bound to raise
alarms. Brown shook the foundations of a framework which had
existed comfortably since 1896;3 amid the welter of desegregation cases
which followed 'Brown, to which were added the series of "Fifth
Amendment" opinions curbing the excesses of the security hysteria of
the past decade, Congress and the Court were quickly maneuvered into
a confrontation.
The Court itself changed composition rather swiftly in this period;
President Eisenhower's five appointments replaced four of Truman's
and one of Franklin Roosevelt's, and were all made within a space of
four years. (See Chart). Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and
Clark embodied the constitutional revolution of the New Deal years;
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan, Brennan and Stewart-and
the fifth Eisenhower appointee, Justice Whittaker-represented the
post-World War II national mind. If the newcomers did not represent
a substantial ideological shift (and, indeed, three of the five were
Frankfurter-type post-New Deal moderates or conservatives), the
fundamental point was that they were new, and hence would deal with
the issues before them on their own terms.
For the remainder of the fifties, then, the Warren Court would
operate in the context of a national political atmosphere charged with
cold war tensions, while seeking its own answers to the judicial
questions it had inherited from the Vinson Court. Among the latter
were two major groups of issues-racial segregation, represented in
Brown, a literal holdover from the last Vinson term; and the balancing
of national security interests and individual liberties, the latter being
subdivided into questions of federal law34 and state law 5 Within these
formative years, the Warren Court would offer its answers to these
several questions s
33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
35. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner, v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
36. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of. Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278
1970]
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The specific outcome of the Brown case was hardly a shock to the
Congressional mind; the remarkably detailed questions on which the
Court had invited argument from counseP7 had rather clearly forecast.
the probable holding. It was, rather, the dynamic and evolutionary
definition of the nature of the Constitution itself, implicit in the opinion
in the.case, which left conservatives in trauma. "In approaching this
problem," the Court had said, "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the nation." 38 With grim clairvoyance, the conservative
mind filled in the implications: if the Court was prepared to read all
wordage of the Constitution in terms of contemporary issues rather
than in terms of what strict constructionists insisted upon calling
"original meaning," there would be no issue in American life which
could not be brought within the scope of constitutional adjudication
Yet this was no novel proposition advanced by the new Chief
Justice-Vinson had said substantially the same thing in Dennis.
"Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that
there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning
only when associated with the considerations which gave birth to the
nomenclature."40 If Vinson's words seemed to advert to "original
meaning," the Dennis case itself had made clear that as circumstances
changed the applicability of the constitutional standard changed; and
in 1951 it had been the liberal mind which had quailed at the
proposition.4 1 But whether or not there were any absolutes, it had
always been evident that absolutes were never more than a
circumscribed area within a broader area of relativism; even Justice
Holmes had regarded questions under the first amendment as questions
of "proximity and degree, ' 42 and Justice Cardozo had sought to
resolve the question of incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into
the fourteenth amendment by singling out for incorporation those
(1961); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beiian v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); cf.
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
37. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
38. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
39. Cf. W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT, chs. 4, 5 (1962).
40. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
41. Cf. Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLU,. L.
REv. 313 (1952).
42. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), cited in Dennis v, United States, 341
U.S. 494, 537 (195 1) (dissenting opinion).
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"specific pledges . . . implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty . . . -.
Of course, Brown was devastating to the conservatives in more
elemental respects as well; like Marbury v. Madison,44 it enunciated a
constitutional first principle on which all succeeding questions in
related subject areas would turn. It was predictable that Cooper v.
Aaron,45 holding that no evasive scheme to avoid desegregation would
be tolerated, would follow upon the heels of the two Brown cases and
with an even greater manifestafion of unanimity. In a desperate last
stand, the conservatives resurrected the rationalization of
"interposition" only to have it summarily disposed of as preposterous
by a United States district court in New Oreleans. 4s There was
ultimately no escape from the proposition flowing from this type of
adjudication: If racial equality was now recognized as part of that
liberty which, in Cardozo's phrase, had been "withdrawn by the
Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states," and
subsequently had been"enlarged by latter-day judgments"-then it was
indeed the supreme law of the land. (See Table II I).
In the face of this harsh reality, the Southern conservatives in
Congress were politically impotent, while Northern conservatives
simply found it impolitic to decry the rule of equality set out in the
segregation cases. A calculated attack upon the new constitutional
liberalism, to have a practical prospect of success, would have to be
launched on a collateral issue. That issue was to be provided by the
Court decisions on the loyalty/subversion, or "fifth amendment,"
cases.
In the fall of 1955, in Toth v. Quarles" the Warren Court began
developing the proposition that ex-servicemen were entitled to civil trial
even for service-connected crimes, and followed with the Reid v.
Covert8 rule (in which the Court reversed itself within a twelve-month
period) on civil trial guarantees to servicemen's dependents. This
shaking of the military establishment sent tremors onto Capital Hill;
they proved to be the first rumblings of a shattering series of opinions
in the area of civilian rights generally.
43. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
46. Bush v. School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (1960), motion for stay of injunction denied per
curiam, 364 U.S. 500 (1960); cf. Morris, The Segregation Cases: An End or A Beginning? 28
OHIo B.J. 187 (1955).
47. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
48. 351 U.S. 487 (1956); 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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While the Court in the "second round" of Reid v. Covert9 could
not but have pleased conservatives when it declared that "the United
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution" and that "no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress...
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution,"5' the conclusion
derived in this instance-that the rights conferred by the Constitution
follow the citizen of the United States wherever he is under the
jurisdiction of the United States, at home or abroad-was calculated
to stir certain doubts. There were doubts in the conservative mind that
were confirmed in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education5 when the
majority decried "the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the
exercise of a person's constitutional right. '.2 This observation, reiter-
ated with increasing frequency, was seen as an articulate challenge to
the sweeping inquiries being asserted by congressional and state legisla-
tive committees into matters of loyalty and subversion.
,The challenge to investigative authority offered by the
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution was most bluntly expressed
in Watkins v. United States,53 where the Chief Justice speaking for the
Court declared that "there is no congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure." He added: "No inquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress."
There were two distinctions which the legislative branch was compelled
to recognize as limitations upon its own functions, said the opinion.
One was the distinction between the public's right to be -adequately
informed on subjects for which legislation was contemplated, and the
individual's right to privacy of personal conviction. The other was the
distinction between the finding of facts by legislative inquiry and the
trying of facts in a judicial setting which properly safeguarded the
individual's privileges.
Watkins was one of a cluster of cases in June 1957. A second of
these demanded that there be explicitly defined authority for and
objectives of investigatory proceedings in state as in congressional
committees 4 Another directed administrative agencies of the federal
government to be bound by the findings of their own investigative
procedures and not override them upon the separate initiative of the
49. 354 U.S. I (1957).
50. Id. at 6, 16.
51. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
52. Id. at 557.
53. 354 U.S. 178, 187, 200 (1957).
54. Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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executive.15 A fourth set aside a conviction based upon undisclosed
reports of an investigation by the F.B.I. 51 Most alarming of all, for an
alarmist-oriented Congress, was the holding in Yates v. United States57
that advocacy of violent overthrow of government had to be shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be an active rather than an abstract
advocacy. Since this nullified the convictions in the original Dennis
case, it was readily accepted by Court critics as a calculated weakening
of the security procedure set out in the original Smith Act.58
In all of the cases, the Warren Court had stressed the basic
principle which would-except in periods when Frankfurter's doctrine
of judicial restraint was ascendant-characterize the major
constitutional decisions of the 1953-69 years. If it was not an
unequivocal declaration of the absolutism of fifth amendment rights in
the "cold war" fifties (for the Court sought to avoid a collision with
Congress by repeatedly stating that the legislature would not be
understood to have intended to extend its inquiries beyond the scope
of its constitutional powers), it was a logical point of departure for
such a declaration by the latter years of the sixties.
Thus the Court, within the first five years of the Warren Chief
Justiceship, came generally to be recognized as an innovative Court.
One critic dourly observed that "judicial statesmanship," which was
the only dignified term he could apply to the new body of law, was too
often just another name for opportunism and like "judicial legislation"
should at best "be held to a minimum."59 But another observer, a few
years later, discounted the popular and political outcries against the
"fifth amendment" cases and found that they were consistent with the
established principles of Bill of Rights interpretation. 0 In each
instance, the writer accepted as his starting premise a fresh dynamism
in the Court's adjudication.
Other evidence of the Court's crystallizing position upon Bill of
Rights guarantees-absolutes or pledges "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"-were manifest in these years. In 1954, the Court
seemed on the verge of an extension of the fourth amendment rule on
search and seizure. In Irvine v. California," four Justices were in favor
55. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
56. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
57. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
58. Cf. W. MURPHY, supra note 39, chs. 6, 7.
59. Braucher, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L. REV. 121 (1955).
60. Sutherland, Foreword: The Citizen's Immunities and Public Opinion, 71 HARV. L. REV.
85 (1957).
61. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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of such a step and four who spoke the "opinion" of the Court were
unprepared to take the step, and the fortuitous concurrence of the ninth
Justice tipped the balance against extension. But two years later, in
Griffin v. Illinois,62 a similar majority of four plus a concurrence spoke
more boldly in a related area: in state criminal proceedings "a state
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color," and accordingly if it provides at all for
appellate review it had to do so regardless of appellants' ability to pay
costs. Near the end of the decade-and at the height of the
congressional furor over the Court-a seven-to-two majority rejected
coerced confessions in state trials as a violation of the Bill of Rights
privileges secured to all defendants.63
The constitutional rationale which was expressed by Congress in
the great Court debate of 1957-58 is significant in its contrast to the
jurisprudence taking shape on the Court itself in this same period. (See
Part III). While the Court itself, in subsequent "Fifth Amendment"
cases, narrowed the application of its 1958 opinions,64 it remained
firmly committed to the basic premise that the Bill of Rights in
particular, and in the Constitution in general, represented the limits to
congressional action. This, of course, might have been the same
language as found in opinions of the pre-1937 Court of laissez-faire
days. -There was, however, a fundamental distinction; the old Court had
read the Constitution as a limitation upon legislative action to meet
developing social and economic issues in order to preserve the private
interests of ever so small a group of entrepreneurs, while the post-New
Deal Court read the legislative article-specifically, article I, § 8-as
broad enough for any reasonable public need, limited only by
enumerated prohibitions in Article I, § 9 and the "concept of ordered
liberty" as suggested in the Bill of Rights. It could be expressed in
another way: where the older constitutionalism had emphasized limited
governmental power, the new constitutionalism emphasized the
obligation of government to exercise power for the common benefit.
Moreover, in the face of governmental inaction, the Court would be
disposed to treat the explicit provisions of the Constitution as self-
executing in effect. This was certainly the basic premise of the "Fifth
Amendment" cases; it was even more evident in the desegregation cases
where the Court, by its concept of the dynamics of the equal protection
62. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
63. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
64. E.g., Uphaus v. Wymann, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment, galvanized legislative machinery
everywhere into a sputtering and coughing start after long inaction.
Where state legislation proved ineffective, congressional machinery was
started up; after Three quarters of a century, a succession of civil rights
measures were added to the federal statutes-and, as a result, the
United States became the-guarantor of certain rights of individuals as
against the states themselves.
Thus the fundamental proposition of the Brown cases may
plausibly be advanced as the basic ingredient in the constitutiopal
theory of the Warren Court. In the succession of desegregation civil
rights cases from 1954 through 1969, the language of concurrence and
dissent'rather clearly demonstrates that the members of the Court
themselves recognized this fact. The non-unanimity of the Court in
these cases (Table III) was not over the -immediate constitutional
question of racial equality,5 but over the logical ultimate dimensions
of the theory.
Burton v. Parking Authority66 in 1961 indicated the Court's
gathering momentum in the broadening of the desegregation principle.
In extending the "state action" doctrine as the Vinson Court had
begun to do in Shelley and Barrows, Justice Tom Clark declared that
"no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring
them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may
be." '6 7 Justice Harlan's dissent at once discerned that "far-reaching
constitutional questions . . . may, or may not, be lurking in this
judgment," and suggested that the particular issue be remanded to the
state courts for consideration of their potentialities.68 The reiteration of
the dynamics of equal protection might have sounded more certainly
in the 1964 sit-in cases 9 had not the Court majority in the principal
case been so divided; nevertheless, Justice Douglas in a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Goldberg declared: "We would reverse the
modern trend were we to hold that property voluntarily serving the
public can receive state protection when the owner refuses to serve some
solely because they were colored.
"We should make that body of law the common law of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments so to speak. '70
65. The firm unanimity in Brown, Cooper v. Aaron, and Lassiter v. Board of Educ. makes
this clear.
66. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
67. Id. at 725.
68. Id. at 729.
69. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
70. Id. at 253-55.
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By the year of this case, congressional machinery galvanized by
the earlier civil rights/desegregation cases had produced the successive
Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964.7' The sit-in cases were
companions to the two major actions testing the constitutionality of the
last of these enactments, and in the Heart of Atlanta Motel2 and
McClung3 cases the Court majority was able to enlarge upon its
rationale in terms of explicit statutory provisions rather than upon
abstract constitutional language-a matter of objection by Justice
Black in the sit-in cases.74 Since Congress had elected to rest its "public
accommodations" provisions on the commerce clause rather than the
equal protection clause, the Court encountered no dissenting argument
although it did not achieve unanimity. In both cases, Clark's opinion
for the Court simply confirmed the post-New Deal rule that the
commerce power was virtually plenary legislative power for anything
Congress itself rationally conceived to be a proper subject of
legislation: "That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in
many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid."75
The principal concurrences in the two "public accommodations"
decisions represented a divergence within the activists' bloc which
would develop more dramatically in later cases. Justice Black uttered
the caveat that "every remote, possible, speculative effect on commerce
should not be accepted as an adequate constitutional ground to uproot
and throw into the discard all our traditional distinctions between what
is purely local, and therefore controlled by state laws, and what effects
the national interest and is therefore subject to control by the federal
laws." ' 76 While acquiescing in the congressional reliance on the
commerce clause in this instance and for this subject-matter, Black
urged that a more appropriate constitutional base might have been the
"necessary and proper" clause. Justice Douglas' concurrence, on the
other hand, found the Court opinion too narrow and urged that "the
right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them
because of race . . . 'occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and
coal across state lines,"' and accordingly called for judicial validation
on the basis of the equal protection clause.77
71. Act of September 9, 1957, PUB. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; Act of May 6, 1960, Pub.
L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86; Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
72. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964).
73. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
74. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
75. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
76. Id. at 275.
77. Id. at 279.
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The crystallizing of the Black viewpoint within the dichotomized
activism of the sixties was finally demonstrated in the "stand-in" cases
following the "public accommodations" decisions. To Justice Arthur
Goldberg's opinidn for the Court in Cox v. Louisiana (I),78 invalidating
as unconstitutionally vague a state law on breaches of the peace where
"the lodging of such broad discretion in a public official allows him
to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will
not, ' 7 Justice Black argued that the holding should not be understood
to deny local governments a reasonable authority to control unruly
street demonstrations.8 1
As though anticipating the near-anarchy of many protest activities
at the ehd of the sixties, Black's dissent in Brown v. Louisiana"s became
more explicit: Where the majority had reversed convictions in a
"stand-in" in a public library, the dissent warned that
the principle espoused has a far greater meaning. It means that the Constitution
(the First and Fourteenth Amendments) requires the custodians and supervisors
of the public libraries in this country to stand helplessly by while protesting groups
advocating one cause or another, stage "sit-ins" or "stand-ups" to dramatize their
particular views on particular issues. And it should be remembered that if one
group can take over libraries for one cause, other groups will assert the right to
do so for causes which, while wholly legal, may not be so appealing to this Court.
The States are thus paralyzed with reference to control of their libraries for library
purposes, and I suppose that inevitably the next step will be to paralyze the
schools.P
In 1966, Justice Black's argument became the Court's opinion,
affirming a conviction of protesters obstructing normal access and
activity in a public jail. He found "no merit to the petitioners'
argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property
over the jail custodian's objections, because this 'area chosen for the
peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only "reasonable" but also
particularly appropriate . . . .' Such an argument has as its major
unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to
propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so
whenever and however and wherever they please. That concept of
constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected . .. .83
Justice Douglas spoke the view of four dissenters (including
Justices Brennan and Fortas and the Chief Justice) in decrying the use
78. 379 U.S. 356 (1965); see Cox v. Louisiana (II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
79. 379 U.S. at 557.
80. Id. at 575.
81. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
82. Id. at 165.
83. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
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of a trespass statute to nullify a constitutional right of peaceful
petition. Obstruction-so long as it is peaceable-may be an incident
of bringing a lawful petition to public attention, said the dissent, but
unless the public places "are so clearly committed to other purposes
that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous," the lawful
protest may be most effective only in the public place (in this instance,
the jail) where the wrong is being perpetrated!'
Thus, as the sixties (and the Warren Court) came to their terminal
point, the logical extremes of constitutional liberty suggested in
questions raised in the first desegregation cases were being reached.
With the departure of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas from
the bench, and with the limits to first amendment rights of assembly
and petition being argued by Justice Black, a terminal point in this
particular constitutional subject had also become discernible. But, what
is more important, the shaping of the Warren Court had taken place
in the early Eisenhower years. The four Kennedy-Johnson
appointments, after all, affected only three positions on the Court, and
of the two of these appointees who remained, one (Justice White)
adhered to the non-activist wing. The desegregation decisions of the
fifties set the stage for the major constitutional argument of the sixties
(see Part IV), while the "Communist" or "Fifth Amendment" cases
of the fifties precipitated the great debate in Congress (see Part III)
which sharpened the judicial wits for the great issues which emerged
in the following decade.
III. THE CLASH WITH CONGRESSS
Congress's role in the development of American constitutional
thought has been too little studied. There is, of course, the primary fact
that constitutional amendment by congressional initiative has to date
been the sole means of change in the text; and the fact that of several
thousand proposals for amendment only thirty have actually been
submitted and only twenty-five of these ratified" attests to the function
of Congress in dissipating the effect of emotionally surcharged plans
to reverse judicial decisions. Whether initiating in Congress or among
constitutents, the loud demands to '"put God back in the Constitution"
after the school prayer decisions, to repeal or amend the fifth
amendment after the provocative opinions of the fifties, to do
something about the states' rights after the broadening of the equal
84. Id. at 54.
85. Statistics on proposed constitutional amendments in App. B of each volume of W.
SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY (1964).
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protection clause in the civil rights and reapportionment cases-all of
these have amounted to "letting off steam" without serious prospect
of a proposed amendment actually getting out of Congress. The
potentially mischievous proposal of the late Senator Everett M.
Dirksen, to call a twentieth-century constitutional convention to
override the "one man, one vote" doctrine, seems likely to have died
with its most ardent advocate.
Constitutional amendments, of course, have overridden specific
judicial decisions. 6 Yet the proposed twentieth amendment to abolish
child labor simply became moot when United States v. Darby7 was
handed down in 1941. The fact is that a constitutional amendment is
a relatively specific and expeditious means of changing constitutional
meaning; but judicial interpretation, whether the Court is a broad or
narrow constructionist at any given period, also eventually recognizes
changes effected by what Justice Felix Frankfurter called the "erosion
of time."
Congress is also, quite properly, its own judge of the constitutional
limits within which the legislative power may be wielded, and
occasionally (and, indeed, all too infrequently) its own understanding
of the constitutionality of its actions is expressed in committee reports
or floor debates on projected bills. Congressional convictions on
constitutional issues may be occasionally discerned in amendatory
legislation, as when part of an original enactment is judicially
invalidated. On rare occasions, these convictions may be expressed in
acerbic terms, as when Congress moved to deal with the "portal-to-
portal" issue in wage-hour cases of the forties.88
In legislative enactments on the judiciary itself, Congress has a
fundamental role to play and, over the national history, has discharged
it responsibility if somewhat belatedly in terms of reforms to promote
efficiency. Thus William Howard Taft, one of the leaders in statutory
modernization of the judicial process, had to begin the work during his
Presidency (1909-13) and continue it during his Chief Justiceship
(1921-30), and even then the completion of his program-the legislative
86. E.g., the eleventh amendment specifically "reversed" Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dali.) 419 (1793); the thirteenth nullified Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1854);
and the sixteenth nullified Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
87. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). lf it be asked whether the Court in Darby
was enacting a judicial amendment to the Constitution, the answer would be another questioh,
whether the Court had originally enacted a judicial amendment in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
88. Thus, the legislature rebutted United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322
U.S. 533 (1944), in Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33.
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ratification of the uniform rules of federal procedure-did not get
through Congress until the decade after his death8 9 The temptation to
play politics in this manifestly sensitive area of separation of powers
has been ever-present, but only on four occasions-in the Jeffersonian
hostility to the Marshall Courtin the first years of the nineteenth
century, in the Reconstruction era, in the "Court-packing" effort of
1937, and in the anti-Court bills of 1957-58-has political hostility
threatened to override the separation principle.
Thus the uproar on Capitol Hill in the waning period of the
loyalty hysteria of the mid-fifties, precipitated by the "Fifth
Amendment" cases presented the Warren Court with a critical
prospect of a direct collision with Congress. There were after-tremors,
as in the undercover attempt to enact "states' rights" amendments
after Baker v. Carr,9 and in its recurrent form of the so-called Dirksen
amendments and Dirksen's campaign to invoke the convention
provision of Article V. But the epicenter of political disturbance was
quite manifestly the anti-Court proposals for 1957-58. When the Court
rode out that crisis, partly as a result of a reduction of conservative
strength in Congress in the fall elections of 1958, and partly as a result
of a qualifying of some of its own "Fifth Amendment" doctrines, 2 the
way was cleared for the affirmative pronouncement of the key doctrines
of the Warren Court in the sixties.
The two sessions of the 85th Congress found conservative political
strength at its highest point since the elections of 1928 and this fact
coincided with a high degree of conservative discontent with current
constitutional decisions. Racial integration was a basic factor in this
discontent, but only Southern Congressmen, Senators, and state
legislators said much about it. The "Southern Manifesto" was
proclaimed,93 followed by statutes and resolutions of "interposition;""4
but whatever -sympathy there might be among Northern conservatives
was tacit rather than overt. Security and loyalty, and the allegation
that Supreme Court opinions were undermining them, were the most
effective rallying points.
A California Congressman declared in the summer of 1957,
89. See A. MASON, ,VILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JUSTICE 119-20 (1965); W. SWINDLER,
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY 271-76 (1969).
90. M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1-49 (1964).
91. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See generally Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: The
Confederating Proposals, 52 GEO. L.J. 1 (1963).
92. See note 64 supra.
93. "Declaration of Constitutional Principles," in 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956).
94. E.g., I RACE REL. L. REP. 437, 443, 445 (1955).
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commenting on the Court's holding95 that the government was required
to open its files for documentary proof of the evidence it offered in
prosecution of subversives, "Conspiracy to burn down a house for the
insurance is a criminal offense, but conspiracy to destroy a
constitutional government by force and violence remains in the same
legal category as running through a red light." The speaker went on
to demand whether "the safety of the American people and their right
to be secure against treason in their midst, is more important than
possible injury to a few known and proven Communists . "..."96
The commentary-not particularly relevant for much of the
time-ranged over scores of pages in the Congressional Record. But
as judicial confusion and concern mounted in the aftermath of the
major "Fifth Amendment" decisions of 1957, a succession of specific
legislative proposals were drafted and reported out by the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees 7 The most drastic of these was the so-
dalled "anti-Jencks bill" introduced by Senator Jenner of Indiana,
even though somewhat moderated by an amendment by the bill's co-
sponsor, Senator Butler of Maryland. The bill, which sought to limit
Supreme Court jurisdiction over legislative and administrative
investigatory procedure, both state and national, failed to rally all-out
conservative support for an anti-Court drive in 1957 when the main
conservative effort was being concentrated on opposing the Civil Rights
Act of that year. But the support came in the spring and summer of
1958.
By the early summer, several'bills had passed the House of
Representatives and had come to the Senate: Each of these aimed
specifically at a Supreme Court decision which had become anathema
to the conservatives, and the fact that a "shotgun" approach had been
employed suggested that one or more, at least, would get through both
houses. There was strong likelihood that if the first one or two were
successful of passage, the momentum thus generated would carry the
rest as well. None of the bills was high on the agenda of the Senate
leadership, but in terms of the organized force of hard-core
conservatives in opposing the judicial branch of the government they
were virtually without precedent-and thus represented a dangerous
precedent in themselves.
One of these-S. 1411, a measure which had originated in the
Senate and then been amended in the House-aimed at reversing the
95. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
96. 103 CONG. REC. 10526, 10534 (1957) (remarks of Representative Jackson (R-Cal.)).
97. Id. at 10534.
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majority holding in Cole v. Young,98 a case from the 1955 term limiting
the effect of the Summary Suspension Act of 1950. Although the Act
had purported to authorize discharge of any government employees
considered to be security risks, the six-to-three majority had held that
the statute could not be read to abrogate the dismissal procedures
under the civil service laws where the government employee was in a
"non-sensitive" position. S. 1411, as amended by the House Post
Office (and civil service) Committee, now provided that the 1950
statute was in fact to apply to all federal employees. Otherwise, said
the committee report, 80 percent of these employees would be outside
the scope of the act (in itself a commentary on the magnitude of the
"sensitive" areas with which security legislation was presumably
concerned).
The anti-Cole bill was one of four which were fated to be tested
in the Senate; another was a bill aimed at the alleged effect of the
majority holding in Yates which one Congressman declared had "made
a shambles of the Smith Act."99 A third dealt with another subject
galling to the states' rightists-the opinion in Pennsylvania v. Nelson"
(ironically, affirming a state supreme court holding) giving a broad
construction to the doctrine of federal preemption of certain legislative
subject areas. But in many respects the most inflammatory of all, in
terms of its lingering irritation for Congress and for some segments of
the organized bar, was the rule set out in Mallory and the congressional
effort to override it.
In Cole, the Court had avoided a direct confrontation with
Congress by limiting the extent of the statute; likewise, in Yates, the
Court had focused upon particular details of the Smith Act rather than
suggesting that the entire statute was an infringement upon
constitutional rights. And in Jencks, while the Court had found the
statute as a whole too broad, and hence invalid, it had left Congress
the option of making the statute less broad and thus preserving its
general objective. The problem of confrontation was thus shifted back
to Congress; if it correctly read the judicial interpretation of the
statutes, a constructive amendment could be drafted-but if the cases
were tossed about Capitol Hill in an ideological free-for-all, any
emerging amendment would be likely to aggravate rather than allay the
danger of confrontation.
Thus it may be said, with the wisdom of hindsight, that the only
98. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
99. 104 CONG. REC. 17169 (1958) (remarks of Senator Keating (R-N.Y.)).
100. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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bill to pass both houses of Congress in the 1957-58 conservative
uprising was a bill which accommodated rather than ."overruled" the
judicial holding. The anti-Jencks measure which was passed in the
summer of 1957 thus avoided a Court-Congress confrontation: Where
the Court in its original opinion had held that a defendant could .not
be convicted on the basis of testimony based upon undisclosed records
of the prosecution, Congress had met the Justice Department's protest
against opening its files to wide-ranging "fishing expeditions" by
providing for subpoena of specific documents by defense counsel under
explicit conditions.'' If the congressional action was in any real sense
a rebuke to the Court, it was less bellicose in its language than had
been the amendatory statutes reacting to the "portal-to-portal" and
interstate insurance cases of the previous decade. 02
The anti-Cole bill would have been a direct challenge to the Court
opinion if it had passed both houses; where the Court in its holding
had found that the 1950 statute could be construed narrowly so as to
avoid conflict with civil service procedures, the advocated amendment
would have precipitated such conflict. Even more serious was the
invitation to confrontation in the anti- Yates bills; where the Court had
sought to avoid handing down a rule that the Smith Act was ex post
facto in certain 'of its provisions, the congressional attempt to insist
upon a full retrospective effect of these provisions might well have
forced the issue. Both bills, thanks "to frenzied parliamentary
maneuvering in the closing days of the 85th Congress, failed of final
passage. The Court itself, in the corfipanion 1961 cases of Scales v.
United States'03 and Noto v. United States,04 made its own
modification of the membership provisions of the Smith Act.
The anti-Nelson and anti-Mallory bills were of a somewhat
different stripe: In the Nelson case, the Supreme Court had accepted
the Pennsylvania court's finding that Congress had indeed intended to
preempt the field of seditious conspiracy under this clause of the Smith
Act.' 0' The conservatives in Congress thus found themselves in an
anomalous position; the effect of the holding was to-confirm the scope
of the Smith Act in this subject-area-but at the same time it limited
the power of the individual states to impose separate (and usually more
101. Act of September 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1964)).
102. See note 100 supra.
103. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
1.04. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
105. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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sweeping) regulations'of the same activities. Thus the congressional
debates sought to preserve the cake and eat it, so far as states' rightists
were concerned; and the question soon departed from the main point
(the amending of the Smith Act to disclaim legislative intent to pre-
empt) and became a long dissertation on federal-state relations in
general.
Mallory was the most long-lasting in its congressional effects; it
would raise issues repeatedly over the next decade as "law and order"
became the catch-phrase of political dialogue. In its original holding
that under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a
confession obtained before expeditious arraignment was inadmissible,,"
the Court essentially reiterated and expanded upon its earlier holding
in McNabb. The vociferous demands for a "clarification" of the
Mallory holding and/or of Rule 5(a) quickly became, like the
discussions of the Nelson issue, a general conservative attack upon the
"coddling" of criminal accused by the high Court.
The 85th Congress's specific attack upon five specific judicial
decisions-Jencks, Cole, Yates, Nelson and Mallory-was
unprecedented in the history of the judiciary; the New Deal complaints
of the mid-thirties had been against the tenor of judicial philosophy as
much as against specific decisions, and had never been brought into
focus until the inept effort of the "Court-packing" proposal of 1937.
The experience of 1957-58 was to have lasting effects upon the Warren
Court and upon the issues which were emerging in the decade of the
sixties. In point of time, the clash with Congress came when the loyalty
issue was entering its last throes, and when the issues of desegregation
were proliferating. The political lessons taught by the fight on Capital
Hill were fairly clear: Racial equality was a constitutional issue which
conservatives could fight only obliquely, and almost certainly without
success-witness the adoption, in this very Congress, of the first civil
rights statute since Reconstruction. As for Bill of Rights limitations
upon government action, the issueWvas already changing from "cold
war" threats to security to the rights of individuals generally as against
government encroachment.
The shift in political climate after 1958 was also a factor in the
opportunities to be seized by the Warren Court in the following years;
several of the most aggressive Court foes in Congress were defeated in
their bids for reelection that fall, and by 1961 an activist, neo-New
Deal administration would take over. The clash with Congress had
106. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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pointed up the ultimate constitutional proposition which had been
taking shape ever since 1937, as the ultimate extreme of the revolution
begun with the New Deal. If the national government was increasingly
to address itself to social and economic subjects which before the
depression decade had been the sole concern of the states, the individual
American would of necessity enter into a new and larger relationship
with the national government. His rights, as set out in the Bill of
Rights as against the national government, would tend to become more
explicit and affirmative-and would also tend to be asserted as against
the states.
Thus the Court of the sixties, surviving the political outburst of
the late fifties, would be emboldened to break new ground on a number
of fronts. Equality of the races in social and economic areas, already
an accepted judicial theory in the fifties, would be augmented by
propositions of equality of the electorate in the reapportionment
questions, and by equality of all defendants before the criminal law in
a substantial extension of the principles challenged but maintained in
the "Fifth Amendment" cases of the fifties. And as an essential
ingredient in this emerging jurisprudence, the incorporation of all the
essential provisions of the Bill of Rights-the concepts synonymous
with "ordered liberty"-would finally be analogized with, if not
incorporated into, the basic provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. ACTIVISM ASCENDANT
The constitutional egalitarianism of the Warren Court developed
swiftly in the Kennedy years. In 1961 came Mapp v. Ohio,"7 followed
by Gideon v. Wainwright0 s in 1963. The basic doctrines of
reapportionment were spelled out in the brief space of twenty months
from 1961 to 1963.9 Engel v. Vitale"n in 1962 completed the rationale
on the religious establishment clause of the first amendment, begun in
107. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of 4th amendment right of privacy
is inadmissible in state court).
108. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant has right to appointed counsel under due
process clause of the 14th amendment).
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (disproportionate representation in voting districts
violates equal protection clause of 14th amendment); Gray v. Sanderi, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)
(county unit system which results in disproportionate vote weighting violates equal protection
clause of 14th amendment); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964) (equal protection clause of
14th amendment requires that congressional districts be apportioned as equally as possible to
population); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment requires that representation in both houses of the state legislature be based as equally
as possible on population).
110. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recital of prayer in public schools violates establishment clause
of Ist amendment).
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the Vinson Court. By the Johnson years of the mid-sixties the
incorporation of major propositions of the Bill of Rights had attained
full momentum. In 1964 were swept back the outer limits of first
amendment freedoms of expression,"' as well as certain fourth
amendment provisions .112 (See Tables I V-VI).
In large part, this acceleration of broad construction was aided by
an important change in Court personnel brought about by the
retirement of Justice Frankfurter in 1962. The architect of the concept
of judicial restraint-essentially, a doctrine that the legislative branch,
having been freed from judicial inhibitions in 1937, had the primary
constitutional responsibility to break new ground-had been the
nucleus of a conservative (or at least non-activist) bloc comprised of
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Whittaker, with the occasional
concurrence of Clark. The departure of Frankfurter was more than the
departure of a single jurist; the circumspect constitutional doctrine
which he developed in the post-1937 Court had, by the time of the
Vinson Chief Justiceship, brought some appearance of order out of the
disparate holdings of the Stone Court."3 The hegemony which he had
assumed by the early fifties continued for virtually a decade, until his
retirement.
It was Frankfurter who kept the reapportionment question in
check for nearly fifteen years;"' his dissents and concurrences on a host
of constitutional issues during the last four years of his tenure (see
Table II) sowed seeds of warning for the divisions on the Court in the
years immediately following. During the latter fifties, he was frequently
joined by Justice Harlan, and less frequently by Justice Clark; so that
when he did in fact depart from the bench, there was a significant
diminution in eloquence for the case for judicial restraint.
With the appointment of Justice Goldberg in Frankfurter's place,
the balance for activism shifted quickly: Warren, Black, Brennan,
Douglas, and Goldberg represented a consistent commitment of a
I 1l. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Ist and 14th amendments require
that a public official prove actual malice to recover in a libel action); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964) (under Ist and 14th amendments, the test for obscenity must employ a national
standard).
112. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (4th and 14th amendments require that the
issuance of a search warrant be based on affidavits establishing probable cause); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) (the standard for obtaining a search warrant is the same under the 4th and 14th
amendments and federal standards of reasonableness must apply).
113. See Allen, supra note 20.
114. Compare Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
266 (1962).
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majority. 115 The result was a recognizable acceleration of new
constitutional doctrine: The progression was as predictable in the area
of defendants' rights" 6 as the progression from the first
reapportionment case to Avery v. Midland County"7 in 1968, while the
extension of the Bill of Rights to the fourteenth amendment led
logically to Douglas's comment that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras.""
The full consequences of the ideological shift of the Court in the
late thirties thus were realized in the Court of the sixties. From the
laissez-faire insistence upon a tightly limited power of government
action to a renaissance of the concept of latent power to meet any
reasonable public need, the constitutional rationale ultimately reached
its logical extreme in the concept of government obligation to take
affirmative and implementary action on specific principles.
As Joseph Story had been the transitional medium for the
jurisprudence of the Marshall Court to that of Chief Justice Taney,"'
Frankfurter had been the transitional medium for the jurisprudence of
the late New Deal to the Warren Court. The full story of Frankfurter's
constitutional doctrine cannot be told here,' but the frequency of his
concurrences and dissents is of some significance (see Table II). In his
concurrence in the 1956 case of Railway Employees v. Hanson,'2 '
Frankfurter quoted Holmes with approval: " 'Where there is, or
generally is believed to be, an important ground of public policy for
restraint [i.e., of private action] the Constitution does not forbid it,
whether this court agrees or disagrees with the policy pursued.' ",2
Where the case manifestly required a major position to be assumed by
the judiciary, Frankfurter did not shrink from action if the facts of the
case provided enough substance to ensure intelligent decision: Thus in
the first Reid v. Covert'23 case he "reserved" his opinion; but after
arguments developed on rehearing, he concurred with the majority and
115. Not that the remaining Justices represented the monolith or the type of conservatism
of the pre-New Deal Court; Clark, Harlan and even Stewart-although less frequently,
White-might be found with the majority on specific issues, or some of them at least found it
possible to concur rather than to dissent.
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
117. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
118. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
119. See W. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 5-65.
120. See. e.g.. Symposium-Justice Felix Frankfurter, 76 HARV. L. REV. I (1962).
121. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
122. Id. at 241.
123. 351 U.S. 487, 492 (1956).
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concluded that the fifth and sixth amendments placed a limitation upon
the administration of military justiceY.4
The reapportionment cases most dramatically demonstrated the
passing of the Frankfurter influence. From 1946, when he had delivered
the opinion of a seven-man Court in a four-to-three division and had
warned against the "political thicket" which lay across the course of
activism,125 until Baker v. Carr2 1 sixteen years later, the issue had been
postponed. Frankfurter's dissent in Baker was to be his intellectual
legacy on the matter of judicial restraint: "In such a matter, abstract
analogies which ignore the facts of history deal in unrealities; they
betray reason."' 2 7 To claim that the equal protection clause required
equal weight or even proportional weight for every vote was to ask the
Court to find "a political conception legally enforceable in the broad
and unspecific guarantee of equal protection," and in his view was
simply a rewriting of the Constitution. 2 8
These words aptly stated the doctrine of restraint; per contra, the
doctrine of activism was the obligation of the judiciary to identify the
specific rights to be guaranteed within the "broad and unspecific
guarantee" which Frankfurter decried. Not to do so, in the conviction
of the Court in the sixties, was to leave identifiable constitutional rights
without possibility of enforcement in the wake of government inaction.
Hence the Warren Court tended increasingly to place its emphasis upon
the "equal protection of the laws;" it did not hesitate to inquire, what
laws-for it had already come to its conclusion on that question. The
laws might be explicit statutory instruments, but they might very well
be, in the alternative, any principle (not merely Cardozo's "specific
pledges") "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." From this
starting point began the march of "incorporation" of Bill of Rights
guarantees into the fourteenth amendment (see Table IV).
In 1956, Frakfurter spoke for the majority in Ullmann v. United
States, 9 denying defendants' arguments that the fifth amendment per
se provided a guarantee against self-incrimination without
congressional implementation. In 1961, Frankfurter dissenting, the
Court was reviving an older judicial comment that the fourth and fifth
amendments run "almost into each other," and rejecting the "ignoble
124. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957).
125. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
126. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
127. Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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shortcut to conviction" provided by the Court's having declined, in
1949, to extend to the states the Bill of Rights prohibition against
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure.3 " Two years later, a
non-dissenting though non-unanimous Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright'' had similarly broadened the reach of the sixth
amendment to the states in right-to-counsel questions in felony cases,
and by 1966 in Miranda v. Arizona '3 2 had virtually made the fifth and
sixth amendments "run into each other."
The double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment was
extended to the states in 1969,1:33 overruling the 1937 case of Palko v.
Connecticut;13 1 the fourth amendment search and seizure clause has
been subject to considerable judicial vacillation "3 5 but has tended
toward the end of the Warren Court to favor a construction favorable
to rights of privacy.3 The first amendment right of association has
been unequivocally broadened since the days of the loyalty hysteria of
the fifties.1 3:7 Wiretap evidence was ruled inadmissible in state criminal
trials in late 1967,1:18 on the heels of divided opinions invalidating state
statutes on the subject of wiretapping earlier in the year.1 3 : The jury
trial guarantee of the sixth amendment was extended to the states in
1968,40 corroborating the "speedy trial" provision and its extension in
a 1967 case,"' and the same amendment's provision for compulsory
process to secure witnesses, applied to the states in another 1967 case."42
The "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition of the eighth
amendment had been under consideration by the Court since Robinson
v. California3 in 1962. Although a badly divided Court in 1968 failed
to broaden the Robinson doctrine,' it seemed on the verge of doing
130. See Harlan's dissent in which Frankfurter joined, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672
(1961).
131. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
133. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
134. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
135. See. e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512 (1966).
136. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
137. See. e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen'l. 383
U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
139. See. e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); cf.. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359, 360, 362, 364 (1967) (dissenting and concurring opinions).
140. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
141. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
142. Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
143. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
144. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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so (vis-a-vis the death penalty) in 1969.11s Thus, in a space of five years
the Warren Court brought the incorporation of most of the "specific
guarantees" of the Bill of Rights into the restraints upon the states set
out in the fourteenth amendment.' The ultimate commitment of the
Warren Court was probably best stated by Justice Douglas in 1965:
"We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need,
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions. 1 17 But, he continued, since the mid-twenties with
its cases on the first amendment rights of expression and association,
the Court has recognized not only that a right set out in the
Constitution was protected from legislative infringement, but that the
protection extended also to unexpressed rights. Douglas then
concluded:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance . . The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clauses enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'" s
While it may be argued that Douglas's opinion did not amount
to an activation of the ninth amendment, the tenor of Bill of Rights
adjudication in the last five years of the Warren Court certainly pointed
in this direction. If, as in Griswold, the case recognized a right of
privacy in constitutional law (however clouded the subject remains in
tort law)' and in the process made much of the fact that it was an
"emanation" from the specific pledge which was essential to give the
pledge "life and substance," it would seem to be a very short step to
finding in the ninth amendment a parallel to "emanations" in the rule
against expressio unius.'5 °
With the inference of activation of the ninth amendment, the
activism of the Warren Court reached its zenith. The remarkable
145. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
146. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
147. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
148. fd. at 484.
149. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm 330-64 (1967).
150. See B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTrEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955).
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division of the Court in Griswold found only Clark joining with
Douglas in the "opinion" of the Court, with five other Justices joining
in three separate concurrences. Yet the basic holdings in the numerous
other Bill of Rights cases in these years logically pointed to the
question of unenumerated rights protected by the ninth amendment and
the circumstances under which the Court could enumerate or activate
them. The outcome of this constitutional trend in the years following
the Warren Court would depend upon the lingering persuasiveness of
the arguments in these Bill of Rights cases, as well as upon the
applicability of the arguments to changing issues.
V. THE FULL CIRCLE
The heritage of the Warren Court in 1953 had been the hard
questions presented by the cold war as well as the logical extension of
the principle of broad constitutional powers established by the Hughes
and Stone Courts. The legacy of the Warren Court can best be stated
in the language of its leading members during these years.
As has been suggested above, the retirement of Justice Frankfurter
in 1962, coinciding with the abating of the cold war issues in Congress
and the renewed pressure of issues of racial equality and voter equality,
marked the era of ascendant activism which reached its climax in the
last half of the sixties. The leading figures on the Court in this period,
in terms of constitutional argument, may thus be identified as the Chief
Justice, Associate Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Frankfurter's
two successors, Goldberg and Fortas-five men representing the
activist bloc. Justice Harlan is rather clearly recognized as the
successor to the Frankfurter advocacy of judicial restraint, paired
frequently with Justices Stewart and White and, until his retirement in
1967, rather often with Justice Clark. Justice Marshall in succeeding
Clark was generally assumed to be a substitution of another activist
for an old-line New Dealer, but his tenure on the Warren Court has
been too brief to warrant consideration here.
Such classifications are all too apt to be invidious, and certainly
are not to be intended to suggest that men like Justice Harlan-who
has emerged as a jurist in the Holmes tradition-are hidebound
conservatives even remotely comparable to the conservatives of the
laissez-faire era. Rather, what is suggested here as the lasting
contribution of the Warren Court is the probing eloquence of the
dialogue in which the activist and non-activist engaged in this period,
which has enriched the constitutional theory to be used as a frame of
reference for the coming judicial generation.
1970]
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TABLE VII
RECAPITULATION OF VOTING RECORD
IN SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Total Unanimous Non-unan. Opinions
Subject of Cases Cases Opinions Opinions w/Dissents
Table III
Desegregation/Civil Rts. 18 3 5 10
Table IV
"Incorporation" 35 2 10 23
Table V
Reapportionment 11 1 10
Table VI
Defendants' Rights 13 2 1I
As the senior member of the Court-and, indeed, having been
appointed to the bench in the vortex of the constitutional revolution of
1937-Hugo L. Black has come to epitomize the broad construction,
all-inclusive definition of the Bill of Rights pledges to be incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment. 5' His concept of the "absolutes" in
the Bill has become professionally a household phrase: "I believe 'that
the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any
governmental system, [to] discuss all governmental affairs, and [to]
argue for desired changes in the existing order,' " he firmly declared
in a concurring opinion in Speiser v. Randal'P5 1 in 1958. He added: "I
also adhere to the proposition that the 'First Amendment provides the
only kind of security system that can preserve a free government-one
that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate,
or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such
views may be to the rest of us.' ",3
In the Cox cases and in Brown v. Louisiana in the next decade,
Black made an accommodation of, although he did not retreat from,
this 1958 view.1 5"4 In 1959, in Smith v. California,1'5  he still was
151. See Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendtent Absolutes, 37 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 549
(1962).
152. 357 U.S. 513, 531 (1958), quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 534, 555-56 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
153. Id. at 532, quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (separate opinion).
154. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissentifg opinion); Cox v. Louisiana
(II), 379 U.S. 559, 575 (1965) (concurring opinion), Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
155. 361 U.S. 147, 159 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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vigorously advancing it-possibly to hasten the demise of the security-
conscious conformity of the decade then ending: "The First
Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has fixed its own
value on freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly
'beyond the reach' of federal power to abridge," and he pointed to the
long line of cases which had made the same provision applicable to the
states. In 1961, Black protested that the constitutional language made
it incumbent upon the judiciary "to guard those liberties the
Constitution defined, not those that may be defined from case to case
on the basis of this Court's judgment as to the relative importance of
individual liberty and government power."' 56
In Black's view, a right set out in the Constitution concurrently
vested in Congress a power "to enforce by appropriate criminal
sanction" the untrammeled enjoyment of such right.157 In Aptheker v.
Secretary of State,15 8 virtually a coup de grace to the ultra-security era,
he found viable rights of individuals in the first, fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments, and he was among the earliest jurists to revive the
constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder as a modern protective
device for the individual. 59 His concurring opinion in Mapp declared:
"I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an
accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its
commands," but this was only to say that he did indeed consider that
the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment and the self-
incrimination prohibition of the fifth amendment "ran into each
other,"'6"
Black was not prepared to state that the search and seizure clause
was self-executing, the burden of his dissent in Berger v. New York,,"
but he was convinced that self-incrimination was a process wholly
barred to government prosecutors.' In Pointer V Texas"3 he spoke the
opinion of the Court in asserting the guarantee of the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment, but in Powell v. Texas 6' he hesitated
to give a blanket extension of the eighth amendment's clause on cruel
156. Braden v. United States, 356 U.S. 431, 444 1961) (dissenting opinion).
157. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 355 (1966) (concurring in part).
158. 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (concurring opinion).
159. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 621 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
160. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961).
161. 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967).
162. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 243 (1967) (dissenting in part).
163. 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965).
164. 392 U.S.514 (1968).
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and unusual punishment. Thus the Justice has avoided the charge of a
doctrinaire advocacy of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights,
although in the process he has inevitably invited the counter-charge that
he either has been inconsistent or has "turned conservative.""'
This is merely to reiterate an oft-overlooked truism, that to seek
to categorize any Justice on the basis of specific statements in his
opinions is to ignore the peculiar facts in the cases from which the
opinions have been exerpted. What is more, or equally, important is
the fact that the opinion of any Justice, however influential he may be
personally, is only one vote on a nine-man bench. Finally, this is to
say that in assessing the constitutional trend of the Warren Court it is
necessary to have a composite rather than a mosaic of individual
Justices' opinions.
With this caveat, one may consider the views of the second in
seniority of the bench. Like Black, Justice Douglas has unhesitatingly
asserted the absolute guarantees of the freedoms of the first
amendment,'66 and has ardently advanced the idea that privacy of belief
is a concomitant of these freedoms . 67 His insistence on the church-state
"wall of separation" has been adamant. 68 He suggested, in his dissent
in Terry v. Ohio,6' that there should be some objective criteria for
distinguishing "reasonable" searches and seizures from the
"unreasonable" ones prohibited by the fourth amendment. On the
other hand, he was prepared, in Schneider v. Rusk,7 ° to read the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment back into the fifth in
order to avoid the temptation of law enforcement authorities to make
assumptions prejudicial to certain classes of citizens.
The basic absolute in the Constitution, in Douglas's view, is the
equality guaranteed to all citizens. Where the law creates a right in one
group (e.g., children injured by parent's wrongful death), he argued
that it could not invidiously discriminate against some children because
they happened to be illegitimate.'7 ' Where there was a basic
qualification for the right to vote, he said in an early reapportionment
165. But cf Howard, Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest Movement and the Rule oJ
Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1030 (1967).
166. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 698
(1959) (concurring opinion).
167. See Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (concurring opinion).
168. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (concurring opinion).
169. 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968).
170. 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
171. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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case, there could be no classification of voters or voting districts that
amounted to discrimination in the effectiveness of individuals' votes. 172
Like Black, and in contradistinction from Douglas, Justice
Brennan has sought to determine from the facts of each case whether
the defendant qualifies for the enjoyment of an absolute privilege set
out in the Bill of Rights. Thus, in the flurry of obscenity cases
beginning in 1966, he suggested that only when all condemnatory
elements had "coalesced"-dominant "prurient interest" theme,
offense to contemporary national tastes, absence of any redeeming
social value-could a conviction be justified.173 Thereupon, he found
"coalescence" absent in the "Fanny Hill" case, but present in
Ginzburg v. United States'74-to the satisfaction of few critics on or
off the Court.
The reasonableness of search and seizure as to the person, as in
police-administered blood tests for alcoholism when time was of the
essence, was upheld by Justice Brennan in Schmerber v. California.75
In the same term of the Court, he suggested that, where a defendant
had knowingly waived his immunity from unlawful entry into his
property, the search and seizure prohibition did not apply. 76 However,
he reemphasized in Henry v. Mississippi,'77 the primary consideration
is whether the individual "understandingly and knowingly" waives a
right preserved for him under the Constitution. "Presuming waiver
from a silent record is impermissible.' ' 7 8 Security from unlawful
invasions from the state was meaningless, in his view, if a waiver could
be gratuitously attributed to a defendant, or a suspect could be placed
under electronic surveillance. 7 '
These three Justices, in their libertarian declarations, expressed the
Warren Court's ultimate extreme in protecting the individual in
modern society from the continual prospect of encroachment by
government apparatus. While the Court, almost to a man, has
acquiesced in this function of the Constitution, the less activist
members have tended to rely on established rules of due process while
the Black-Douglas-Brennan sector has shown a greater readiness to
develop new rules within the generalities of the equal protection clause.
172. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
173. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
174. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
175. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
176. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
177. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
178. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
179. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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Equal protection, Brennan observed in Sherbert v. Verner,8' begins
with the individual's right which is brought into question by the
operation of the law; this may be a different (perhaps opposite) thing
from saying that the law should operate equally on all individuals (a
first premise of due process).
In the view of Justice Harlan, and to a large degree of Justice
Stewart, the fundamental problem of equal protection jurisprudence is
its tendency to encourage a succession of judicial definitions of rights
to be enjoyed ufnder the fourteenth amendment. In concurring in
Giiswold, Harlan warned that "the 'incorporation' doctrine may be
used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process," an
interpretative presumption which he found "as unacceptable
constitutional doctrine as is the use of 'incorporation' to impose upon
the states" Bill of Rights restraints.' t In the same case, Justice Stewart
took vigorous exception to Douglas's majority opinion in its suggestion
of "penumbras" in the Bill of Rights latent in the ninth
amendment"'5 -and Black joined him in this instance: "If any broad,
unlimited power to hold laws unconstitutional because they offend what
this Court conceives to be 'the collective conscience of our people' is
vested in this Court by the Ninth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution, it was not
given by the Framers, but rather has been bestowed on the Court by
the Court." 1
The swift broadening of Bill of Rights concepts which climaxed
in Douglas's opinion in Griswold has stimulated the Harlan-Stewart-
White sector of the Court to emphasize again the specific nature of
these rights as a requisite for extending them through the fourteenth
amendment to the states. The alternative, and the danger, in the view
of this sector, is to extinguish the "incongruity" between national and
state standards of procedure which is the first principle of a federal
system.' While Harlan occasionally has been provoked into gratuitous
denigration of "the onward march of the long-since discredited
'incorporation' doctrine,""' his greater service has been in his tightly
reasoned opinions on the limits to inevitable incorporation of
guarantees "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '86
180. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
181. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965).
182. Id. at 527.
183. Id. at 507. 1
184. Cf Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
185. Cf Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
186. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 500 (1965).
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Like Frankfurter, Harlan.has consistently argued that where there
are alternatives for state procedure the Court should avoid a holding
which extends a constitutional rule beyond the specific flaws in the
procedure then under review. 187 Among the great issues of the period
1953-69-racial equality, reapportionment and defendants'
rights-the Harlan-led dissents have been primarily directed at the
latter two. In Baker v. Carr,18 Harlan was emphatically in agreement
with Frankfurter: If voter equality is read into equal protection, this
presupposes a definition of the relationship between the voter and the
government which has authority over the electoral process-and, as he
suggested in his companion dissent, this could only mean a federally
guaranteed voter right which was not to be found in the fourteenth
amendment. This, he warned in his dissent in Reynolds v. Sims,'89 in
turn could only lead to "a radical alteration in the relationship between
the States and the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal
Judiciary" which would police the relationship. "Only one who has an
overbearing impatience with the federal system and its political
processes will believe that that cost was not too high or was
inevitable."
In 1969, Harlan was still protesting that the broadening of equal
protection concepts was "an increasingly significant exception to the
long-established rule that a statute does not deny equal protection if it
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." The
alternative, as he saw it, was a disposition of the Court to inquire
whether the criteria for the legitimate objective were themselves
"suspect," or whether the governmental objective was such a
"compelling governmental interest" as to meet the primary right of the
individual to be free from the governmental action. 90 Three years
earlier he had pointed out that the "suspect" action impairing the
exercise of constitutional rights might well be private rather than
governmental, and that there was "a difference in power between states
and private groups so great that analogies between the two tend to be
misleading."'' The fundamental threat in the defendants' rights cases,
Harlan warned, was to place this Court in the position of making
criminal law under the name of constitutional interpretation, 2 and
187. Cf Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 806 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
188. 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962).
189. 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964).
190. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
191. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 774; cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175-76 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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thus to undermine the legislative responsibility in this subject at both
the federal and state levels.
Throughout this line of opinions there is a fundamental acceptance
of the ultimate validity of government action provided, first, that the
separation of powers (i.e., federal and state) assumed by the
Constitution is adhered to, and, second, that the proper power (i.e.,
legislative rather than executive or judicial) is -employed.' Thus the
consensus of the Warren Court-while it was'punctuated and qualified
by fundamentally divergent views on occasion-has been the validity
of the concept of broad governmental power which was established in
1937 by West Coast Hotel Co. and Jones & Laughlin Steel.
Given this fact, the great principles established in the sixties-the
universality of racial equality, the equitable balancing of individual
electors, the extension of specific pledges of the Bill of Rights if not
their "penumbras"-may reasonably be expected to remain as the
enduring features of the Warren Court. The unsettled business left over
from the great dialogue between the activists and the non-activists,
which will be the business of the Burger Court, includes the definition
of ultimate limits to the application of these principles and-perhaps
of most importance in the constitutional history of the rest of this
century-the integration of all of the judicial criteria, from Article I
through Amendment XXV, into a consistent corpus of modern
constitutional law.
193. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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